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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
o~F THE STATE 0'F UTAH 
FLORA M. ROBISON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
PETE WILLDEN, a minor, by and 
through his guardian Ad Litem, 
MARVELL WILLDEN, and 
MARVELL WILLDEN, 
Defendants and .Ap,pella;nts. 
Case 
No. 8597 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his brief, the defendant has made a fragmentary 
statement of facts, which we do not consider sufficient. 
However, in the discussion which follows, we have mar-
shalled the pertinent facts in the nature of supplement 
to appellant's statement; and to avoid unnecessary repe-
tition, these facts are not set out under this heading. 
Throughout this brief, the appellant is referred to as 
the defendant and the respondent as the plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUFFICIE-NT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Both points argued in appellant's brief are based 
upon an alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support 
the findings and judgment of the trial court. The appel-
lant does not question the findings of the court with 
respect to the injuries which plaintiff received or the 
causal connection of those injuries with the collision 
which occurred; neither does he claim contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff. He simply asserts 
that, as a matter of law, the defendant was not negligent; 
and that the defendant's negligence did not cause the 
collision to occur. The evidence which refutes defend-
ant's contentions is hereinafter summarized. 
The plaintiff testified as follows : 
''A. I looked south and saw a car coming 
about three hundred feet away right in front of 
the Oakwood Apartments, and I saw that I had-
ordinarily I had plenty of time to make the turn 
because I have driven in and out there for thirty-
six years, and so I made the turn, but he was 
coming at such a rate of speed that he caught me 
before I got in the aYenue. 
"Q. No\Y, you say that he appeared to be 
in front of the Oak\vood Apartments \Yhen you 
sa\v him as you \Yere making your turn~ 
'' 1\.. l.,.. es. If anything, farther south, because 
he "Tas-\:vell, that's right on the corner, but it 
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wouldn't be quite to Sixth South on account of 
the curbing. 
'' Q. To what extent did you slow before you 
made your turn~ 
''A. I think I stopped. If I didn't stop sud-
denly, I slowed up mighty slow before I would 
make the turn. 
'' Q. Did you make a signal for the turn~ 
''A. Yes. 
'' Q. How did you make the signal for the 
turn~ 
''A. Well, my light signals are good, and 
that's the way I make it. 
'' Q. Do you have a lever on the steering post 
of your automobile that you operate a turn signal 
with~ 
"A. Yes. 
'' Q. And did you pull this lever to signal a 
left turn before you started to make the turn~ 
"A. Yes." (R. 10-11) 
The plaintiff was in the lane nearest to the center of 
the highway when he commenced to make his turn, and 
before he started the turn he saw the defendant coming 
at that time. The defendant was 300 feet south and 
there were no other cars bet,veen the defendant's car 
and the plaintiff's. The defendant's car ''ras in the lane 
of traffic nearest the cur b. There were two lanes of traffic 
on 5th East Street on each side of the center line, besides 
the parking area. The impact was in the outside lane of 
traffic next to the parking lane. (R. 18-19) 
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On cross-examination, George F. Robison, the driver 
of the car in which plaintiff was · riding, testified as 
follows: 
''A. I could observe the traffic, yes, I saw 
him coming down there but didn't know he was 
traveling at such a rate of speed. 
"Q. All right. Now, then, when you started 
your left turn, that was when he was at three hun-
dred feet away~ 
"A. Yes." (R. 22) 
In describing the traffic situation prior to the impact, 
Mr. Robison stated that there were a number of cars 
going south at the time on 5th East, but the only car 
approaching from the north was the defendant's car. It 
was still daylight. (R. 27) 
William Adelbert Robison was a witness called by 
the plaintiff, who resides at 635 South 5th East. He was 
not related to the plaintiff. He first noticed the Robison 
car pull up behind him when he was stopped for the red 
light on 5th South on 5th East. (R. 40) As the witness 
proceeded south, the Robison car remained behind him 
in the same lane of traffic. He remembers looking through 
his rear-vie"r mirror and seeing the Robison car com-
mence the turn. The 'Yitness sa"T the defendant's car, 
vvhich passed hin1 about half-,yay from the Ha"Tthorne 
Court intersection to 6th South. He did not anticipate 
there 'vas going to he a collision at the time the defend-
nnt 's car passed him. The defendant's car appeared to 
he going heyond the speed limit. (R,. 42) He did not see 
the collision oecur, but he heard the noise 'vhen the cars 
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hit. (R. 43) The witness did not observe any other cars 
proceeding northerly, except the defendant's car. (R. 46) 
This witness was traveling about 25 miles per hour, and 
he had reached a point about half the distance between 
6th South and the Hawthorne Court intersection before 
the defendant's car, approaching from the opposite di-
rection, passed him. (R. 47) 
Glen S. Cahoon, the police officer who investigated 
the accident after it had occurred, testified that the de-
fendant's vehicle traveled 126 feet from the point of 
impact before it came to rest; that the Robison vehicle 
was damaged in the front door, rear door and fender, 
quite extensively in the rear door. The Robison car was 
resting against a third car which had been parked along 
the side of the road facing north. (R. 52) There were 
no brake marks on the highway at all. Upon apply-
ing the brakes on the defendant's vehicle, there were 
none. There was no liquid on the highway to indicate 
that the brakes had lost their fluid at the scene of 
impact. (R. 53) Several officers tried the brakes in the 
presence of the defendant to indicate to him there 
weren't any. (R. 54) The defendant's vehicle was dam-
aged quite extensively on the right front. (R. 56) The 
defendant admitted that he was exceeding the 30 m.p.h. 
speed limit in driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour 
and estimated his speed at the time of impact to be 35 
miles per hour, according to the statement made by the 
defendant to Officer Young. (R. 75) He first noticed dan-
ger of an accident when he was 10 feet away. He told the 
officer that he was going north and was looking at a 
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parked car and the other car turned in front of him and 
he couldn't stop in time. (R. 76) The defendant testified 
as follo,vs : 
'' Q. What was the first thing you saw of Mr. 
Robison's car1 
''A. I just saw-I saw him whip in a flash of 
white paint as my headlights went across his 
paint, and I hit him. 
Q. You say white paint~ 
"A. It was light paint. I had my lights on 
and seen the glare of the lights on the shine of the 
car, and I hit him. 
'' Q. Had you seen his car before he made the 
turn~ 
"A. No, I hadn't." 
The defendant admitted that his brakes did not 
function properly. (R. 97) On cross examination the 
defendant stated that he was about 30 feet away when 
he first saw the Robison car. (R. 103) 
Certainly this is evidence sufficient to sustain a find-
infi of failure to maintain a proper lookout, especially 
\vhen vie\Yed in light of the evidence that the Robison 
car gnve a light signal and c.ommenred its turn \vhen 
the defendnnt \vas still 300 feet a\Yay. If the defendant 
had been maintaining a reasonable lookout he would have 
hoco1ne a\Ynre of Robison's intention to turn and of his 
net of tnrnin~ in ~ufficient time to permit him (the de-
l'eudant) to altl)l' his course or decrease the speed of his 
vehiele. 
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We will proceed to a discussion of the cases cited 
by the- defendant in his brief. On page 24, the defendant 
invites this court's examination of the case of Hickock 
vs. Skinner, 113 Ut. 1, 190 P. 2d 514, and this seems rather 
strange to us in view of the fact that he also cites the 
more recent case of Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Ut. 484, 243 
P. 2d 7 4 7, in which this court expressly overruled the case 
of H ickock vs. Skinner. At any rate, this court said at 
page 751 in the Martin vs. Stevens case: 
"If as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe in 
his concurring opinion, the facts of H ickock vs. 
Skinner, supra, do not bring it within the principle 
above stated, it was wrongly decided and is 
here by overruled.'' 
In the case of Martin vs. Stevens, the question of 
contributory negligence was before the court, and as the 
plaintiff approached the intersection of Stratford Avenue 
and 18th East Street he first saw the defendant's car 
when it "\vas about 60 feet from the intersection. In the 
case at bar, the distance separating the two cars was 300 
feet, when Mr. Robison commenced to enter the inter-
section and make his turn. Yet in the Stevens' case, the 
court held, and rightly so, that the question of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence was for the jury and could 
not be determined as a matter of law. We do not per-
ceive how the Mart in vs. Steven-s case can provide any 
comfort and encouragement to the defendant in the case 
at bar. 
In the case of Lou,der vs. Halley, 120 U t. 231, 233 P. 
2d 350, cited with approval in the 1J1artin vs. Stevens case, 
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supra, it was held that the driver .of a vehicle which had 
entered the intersection when the defendant's car was 
250 feet away could reasonably assume that the defend-
ant would yield him the right of way. Although the ques-
tion of contributory negligence is not herein involved, we 
think the principle in the Matrin vs. Stevens and Lowder 
vs. Halley case, supra, would support a finding that the 
defendant in the case at bar failed to yield the right of 
way and failed to maintain a reasonable lookout. 
The defendant has cited the case of Cederloff vs. 
lVhited, 110 Ut. 45, 169 P 2d 778, to support his claim 
that the failure to keep a proper lookout on his part 
could not have been one of the proximate causes of the 
accident. There are many distinguishing factors be-
t,veen that decision which was written by Mr. Justice 
Wade and the case at bar. In the Cederloff case, the 
situation was reversed. The defendant attempted to turn 
into the path of plaintiff's car. The driver of the turning 
vehicle did not see the other car prior to impact, which 
would compel a finding that the driver of the turning 
vehicle was negligent as a matter of law. In the case 
there was undisputed testimony to the effect that the 
plaintiff's car was traveling between 25 and 30 miles per 
hour, and there 'vas no evidence that the turning car ever 
acquired a right of way. In the Cederloff case, there was 
no intersection involved. In the case at bar, the driver 
of the Robison's Yehicle signaled for the left turn at an 
intersection, sa"· the defendant approaching from the 
opposite direction at a distance of 300 feet, which would 
have permitted Robison ample time to complete his turn, 
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if the defendant had been traveling at a lawful rate of 
speed. If the defendant in the case at bar had been 
maintaining a proper lookout, he would have perceived 
that plaintiff was intending to turn and in the act of 
turning; and the defendant was sufficiently far away to 
permit him to adjust to the situation by reducing his 
speed or turning to avoid the collision. Coupled with 
the defendant's inattention were his totally ineffective 
brakes and his excessive rate of speed. Indeed, there 
was no evidence of any brake marks at all on the high-
way. According to the driver of the Robison vehicle, 
the impact occurred near the east line of 5th East Street, 
and the damage to the Robison car indicated that the 
greater force of the impact was toward the rear. There 
was no evidence that the defendant swerved his vehicle 
at all prior to impact, although he had another lane of 
traffic on his side of the road in which to turn. Under all 
these circumstances, which differed from the Cederloff 
case, we believe the trial court was justified in finding 
that the Robison vehicle had acquired the right of way 
and the failure of the defendant to yield that right of 
way and to maintain a proper lookout was a proximate 
cause of the collision. 
The case of French vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Ut. 
406, 216 P. 2d 1002, also cited by the defendant, is distin-
guishable from the case at bar. In that case the truck was 
traveling between 20 and 25 miles per hour and was 
from 100 to 120 feet away when first noticed by the car 
which attempted to turn to the left. The eourt held that 
the turn was negligent as a matter of law, and the other 
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vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
The court did not pass upon the negligence of the defend-
ant in that case and affirmed a nonsuit awarded by the 
trial court against the plaintiff. The question of con-
tributory negligence, as heretofore pointed out in this 
brief, is not involved in this case. 
In the case of Richards vs. Palace Laundry, 55 Utah 
409, 186 P. 439, relied upon by the defendant, the right 
of recovery in that case was entirely based upon the 
last clear chance doctrine, and there was no evidence 
whatsoever that the defendant saw the plaintiff fall on 
the street on defendant's side of the road in time to per-
mit the defendant to avoid hitting him. In that case there 
was no intersection involved, and the plaintiff fell from 
his bicycle into the path of the defendant's truck when 
the truck was not more than 25 or 35 feet away. We do 
not disagree with the principles of law asserted by the 
case of Richards vs. Palace Laundry, supra, but the facts 
of the case are not at all comparable to the facts in the 
case at bar. 
In his brief the defendant engaged in some mathe-
matical gymnastics based upon premises not supported 
by all the evidence, and upon fragments of evidence con-
sidered out of context, 'vhich, "~e belieYe, do not pro-
vide assistance to this court in deciding this case. The 
burden is on the defendant in this case to show the ab-
sence of evidence that reasonably supports the findings 
of the trial court. The defendant does not sustain this 
burden by selecting fragments of eYidence more favor-
able to him and making mathematical calculations based 
10 
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thereon. In this case, the defendant cannot escape from 
the evidence that he was 300 feet away when the driver 
of the Robison vehicle commenced its turn across the 
center line of the highway. The defendant was looking at 
a parked car and did not see the Robison vehicle until, 
to use his language: ''I just saw-I saw him whip in a 
. 
flash of white paint as my headlights (which were not 
burning) went across his path and I hit him.'' He did not 
see the Robison car at all until he made the turn. (R. 76) 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing discussion, we earnestly con-
tend that therH was ample evidence to support the find-
ings of the trial court that the defendant was negligent in 
failing to maintain a proper lookout and in failing to 
yield the right of way to the vehicle in which plaintiff was 
riding as a guest passenger and that the judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WOODROW D. WHITE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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